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ABSTRACT.  
A hash function usually has two main components: a 
compression function or permutation function and mode of 
operation. In this paper, we propose a new concrete novel design 
of a permutation based hash functions called Gear. It is a hash 
function based on block cipher in Davies-Meyer mode.  It uses 
the patched version of Merkle-Damgård, i.e. the wide pipe 
construction as its mode of operation. Thus, the intermediate 
chaining value has at least twice larger length than the output 
hash. Also, we analyze Gear and prove it is hard to attack it with 
complexities significantly less than brute force and it resists all 
the generic attacks. And the permutations functions used in Gear 
are inspired from the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl hash function which 
is originally inspired from Rijndael design (AES). As a 
consequence there is a very strong confusion and diffusion in 
Gear.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTING AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS]: Security and Protection – 
Authentication, Insurance.  
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords: WP - permutation – block cipher – AES  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Cryptographic hash functions have indeed proved to be the 
workhorses for modern cryptographic hash functions. Another 
name given to cryptographic hash functions is “Swiss knife 
army” because it can serve many different purposes such as 
digital signatures, conventional message authentication to secure 
passwords storage or forensics data identification. 
Cryptographic hash functions take an unfixed size of input and 
produce a fixed size of an output. 
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 A hash function usually built from two main components: (1) a 
basic primitive compression function C and (2) an iterative 
mode of operation H, where the symbol HC denotes the hash 
function HC based on the compression function C. Most hash 
functions in use today are so-called iterated hash functions, i.e. 
Merkle-Damgård (MD), based on iterating a compression 
function. Examples of iterated hash functions are MD4, MD5, 
SHA and RIPEMD-160. For a cryptographic hash function HC, 
if the compression function C is resistant to the following 
attacks, then the hash function considered secure:  
• Preimage: given y = H(x), find x
’
 such that H(x
’
) = y, 
• 2nd preimage: given an x and y=H(x) find x
’
 ≠ x such 
that H(x
’
) = y, 
• Collision: find x and x
’
 such that x
’
 ≠ x and H(x) =H(x
’
). 
 
Recently, several collisions were announced which decreased 
the security of some of the existing hash functions. Particularly, 
collisions were announced in SHA-0, MD4, MD5, HAVAL-
128, and RIPEMD. French researcher Antoine Joux et al. [17] 
presented the collision in SHA-0, and a group of collisions 
against MD4, MD5, HAVAL- 128, and RIPEMD were found by 
the Chinese researcher Xiaoyun Wang with co-authors Dengguo 
Feng, Lai, and Hongbo Yu [30]. After that, in February 2005, 
the same Xiaoyun Wang, Lisa Yiqun Yin, and Hongbo Yu 
found collisions in SHA-1 using 269 hash computations [30]. 
Several strategies were developed to thwart these attacks. Stefan 
lucks et al. [23] introduced the Wide Pipe (WP) hash 
construction as an intermediate version of Merkle-Damgård to 
improve the structural weaknesses of Merkle-Damgård design. 
The process is similar to Merkle-Damgård algorithm steps 
except of having a larger internal state size, which means the 
final hash digest is smaller than the internal state size of bit 
length. For example, the final compression function compresses 
the internal state length (for ex, 2n-bits) to output a hash digest 
of n-bit. This simply can be achieved by discarding the last half 
of 2n-bit output. WP is used in this paper to construct Gear hash 
function. It is used as an operation of mode for Gear. Mridul 
Nandi and Souradyauti Paul et al. [31] proposed the fast wide 
pipe (FWP) construction to overcome these attacks. It is twice 
faster than the wide pipe construction. HAsh Iterated 
FrAmework (HAIFA) is also a patched version Merkle-
Damgård construction [32]. HAIFA design solves many of the 
internal collision problems associated with the classic MD 
 construction design by adding a fixed (optional) salt of s-bits 
along with a (mandatory) counter Ci of t-bits to every message 
block in the iteration i of the hash function. Wide-pipe and 
HAIFA are very similar designs. Where, sponge construction is 
an iterative construction designed by Guido Bertoni, Joan 
Daemen, Micheal Peeter and Gilles Van Assche to replace 
Merkle-Damgård construction [2]. It is a construction that maps 
a variable length input to a variable length output. Keccak 
(SHA-3 winner) hash function uses sponge construction. In the 
next section, we demonstrate our new proposal Gear hash 
function in more details.  
2. OUR PROPOSAL 
We propose a new hash function called Gear that supports 256-
512 bits digests. The basic building block of our hash is a block 
cipher. By applying standard design approaches next we create a 
compression function (based on the cipher), and finally a hash 
function. We use the following design techniques: 
 The block cipher applies the wide trail strategy. 
 A compression function based on the block cipher in 
Davies-Meyer mode. 
 A hash built upon an iterative compression function with 
the Merkle-Damgård construction. 
 A wide pipe construction, i.e. the intermediate chaining 
value has at least twice larger length than the output hash. 
3. Design Goals  
The main design goal of any modern hash function is the 
security of the construction. In the last several years, the notion 
of security has expanded to include not only the basic 
requirements on collisions and second preimage resistance, but 
also a wide variety of distinguishers. In fact, non-formally a 
hash function is supposed to behave as a random oracle. 
Although in this model, trivial distinguishers do exist for every 
hash function, the designers aim to construct hash function that 
will be resistant against all possible non-trivial distinguishers, 
i.e. the hash does not exhibit any structural distinguishers, and, 
in a line of notation from the Sponge design [2], it is a hermetic 
design. 
We aim to achieve this high security requirement with our 
proposal as well. More precisely, we would like to achieve the 
standard security margin against the following attacks and 
structural distinguishers: 
 No collisions can be found in n-bit Gear with significantly 
less than 2n 
hash function invocations 
 No (second) preimage can be found in n-bit Gear with 
significantly less 
then 2n invocations 
 No non-trivial structural distinguishers can be found for 
Gear with a complexity significantly lower than the 
complexity required to find (or confirm) such property in a 
secure hash function (such as SHA-2, SHA-3, etc.) Here, 
we would like to point out that the deviation “significantly 
lower” from “lower” is introduced to annulate the analysis 
based on the recently discovered bicliques[7] – the latest 
results suggest that such analytical results are most likely 
applicable to all cryptographic primitives, thus one cannot 
expect the achieve the ideal security level. On the other 
hand, the complexity of the attacks not based on 
granulation of the compression function (i.e. all other 
analysis except bicliques), should always exceed our 
claimed security bound. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF Gear 
Our proposal Gear is a wide pipe hash function with an internal 
state of 1024 bits. It supports digests of 1 to 512 bits. For 
security reasons, we suggest a minimal output of 256 bits – 
further we describe the two main versions Gear - 256 and Gear -
512, with an output length of 256 and 512 bits, respectively. We 
emphasize that these two versions, as well as all the possible 
versions with a hash output between 256 and 512 bits, are based 
on the same primitive, and differ only in the number of bits that 
are truncated at the output of the primitive. Our hash function is 
based on a cipher C- Gear used in the Davies-Meyer mode to 
build a compression function. We use Merkle-Damgård to 
construct the hash upon this compression function. Further we 
describe in details the cipher and give a brief recall of the mode.  
4.1 The Cipher C-Gear 
The block cipher C- Gear (P, K) is an SP network with 16 rounds 
and designed according to the wide trail strategy. It has a state of 
1024 bits and supports 1024-bit keys. The state as well as the 
key is seen as 8x16 matrix of bytes – with ai,j,bi,j,i = 0,...,7,j = 
0,...,15 we denote the individual bytes of the state and key 
matrices, respectively. 
In each of the 16 rounds, the state S undergoes four byte-
oriented transformations, i.e. round R can be represented as: 
R = AK ◦ MC ◦ SR ◦ SB, 
Where AK, MC, SR, SB are acronyms for AddRoundKey, 
MixColumns, ShiftRows, and SubBytes, respectively. An 
additional AddRoundKey is perform at the beginning of the 
state update transformations (known as key prewhitening). 
The 1024-bit subkey Ki used in the i-th round is 
produced from the previous subkey Ki−1 with similar operations: 
Ki =AC◦MC◦SR◦SB(Ki−1), 
Where AC stands for AddRoundConstant. The prewhitening key 
K0 is the initial master key. The round and key schedule 
transformations are the standard operations used in most of the 
Rijndael-based primitives. For completeness of the description, 
in the sequel we give a brief definition. The superscripts new, 
old are used to denote the updated, previous values for the bytes 
(or the columns). 
SubBytes (SB). This transformation is the only non-linear part 
of the cipher. It consists of independent application of 8x8 bit S-
box to all the bytes of the state (or the subkey), etc. 
 
We use the invertible AES S-box S(·) for this purpose which is a 
composition of a finite field inversion and an affine 
transformation. The precise definition of the S-box is given in 
Table 1 in the form S(X1X2) = Y. 
ShiftRows (SR). It performs a cyclic shift of the rows of the 
matrix on different offsets that depend on the row index. The 
value of the offsets ria, rib, i = 0, . . . , 7 is different for the state 
and the key schedule: 
 
The precise values are given in Table 2. 
 MixColumns (MC). The diffusion among the bytes is achieved 
with this transformation. It is a multiplication of the columns aj , 
bj of the state/subkeys by a matrix M: 
  
Where M is defined as: 
Table 1: The S-box used in Gear 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The offsets used in ShiftRows 
 
 
 
We emphasize that the same matrix is used for both the state and 
key schedule. The multiplication is performed in GF(28) defined 
with the irreducible polynomial x8 +x4 +x3 +x+1. 
AddRoundKey (AK). The 1024-bit subkey is xored to the state. 
The XOR can be seen as byte-wise, i.e.: 
 
AddRoundConstant (AC). A constant Ci is xored to the subkey 
Ki – in a similar fashion, it can be represented as a byte-wise 
operation. The value of the constants is dependent on the index 
i. It is defined as: 
 
4.2  The Hash Function Gear 
Once we have defined C- Gear, we use a standard approach to 
build a hash function based on this cipher. First, we define the 
compression function CF. It takes two inputs: 1024-bit chaining 
value Hi and 1024-bit message Mi, and produces 1024-bit 
chaining value Hi+1 with Davies-Meyer mode of C- Gear, i.e.: 
Hi+1 = CF(Hi, Mi) = C- Gear (Hi, Mi) ⊕ Hi 
Further, we use this compression function to build a hash 
function with the Merkle-Damgård construction. Briefly, we fix 
an initial chaining value H0 equal to the first 128 bytes of the 
fractional part of π (see Table 3). We pad the message M (see 
below how the padding is performed), and split the expanded 
message into 1024-bits chunks Mi. Next, we iterate all the 
message blocks using the compression function based on the 
Merkle-Damgård construction: 
 H0 = IV 
Hi+1 = CF(Hi, Mi) 
When the expanded message contains l blocks, the output Hl+1 is 
used to produce the final hash based on truncation, i.e. the hash 
of M is tr(Hl+1), there tr(X) truncates the leftmost bits of X, 
depending on the hash size.  
Table 3: The initial chaining value H0 
Thus, for 256-bit digests, tr(X) outputs the 256 lefttmost (most 
significant) bits of X, while for 512-bit digest this number is 
512. In general, for Gear −n, tr(X) outputs the n most significant 
bits of the last produced chaining value Hl+1. 
The padding. This procedure produces expanded message Me 
from the original input message M. It assures that the length (in 
bits) of M is properly encoded into the expanded message Me, 
and the length of Me is divisible by 1024. To achieve this we use 
a trivial padding by attaching a required number of 0’s to make 
the last message 
block 1024 bits, and always introduce an addition message block 
at the end that contains the length of M only. 
Let M has t bits. Then from M, first we produce Me ̃ = M00...0, 
where the number of 0’s is 1024−(t mod 1024) when t is not 
divisible by 1024 – otherwise we do not attach any 0’s. Next, we 
attach an additional 1024-bit block that contains 1024 − 64 = 
940 zeros, while the last 64 bits are equal to t, i.e. the expanded 
message is defined as Me = Me ̃00...0tbinary. 
Endian and mappings. Our hash function is little endian 
oriented – it regards 64-bit words as 8 bytes in reverse order 
(with the least significant byte coming first). Furthermore, the 
mapping of byte sequence to matrix of the state (or the key 
schedule) is from left to right, and top row to bottom row. For 
example, the 128-byte sequence a1, . . . , a128 is mapped to the 
matrix as follows: 
 
5. PSEUDO CODE AND TEST VECTORS 
The pseudo codes of state round, keyschedule round, C- Gear and 
Gear is given in Algorithm 1-4 respectively  
Algorithm 1 State  Round(S, Ki) 
S ← SubBytes(S) 
S ← ShiftRows(S) 
S ← MixColumns(S) 
S ← AddRoundKey(S, Ki) 
 
end 
Algorithm 2 KeySchedule  Round(Ki, i) 
Ki+1 ← SubBytes(Ki) 
Ki+1 ← ShiftRows(Ki+1) 
Ki+1 ← MixColumns(Ki+1) 
Ki+1 ← AddRoundConstant(Ki+1, i) 
 
end 
Algorithm 3 C− Gear (P, K) 
S ← AddRoundKey(P, K) K0 ← K 
for i = 0 to 15 do 
Ki+1 ← KeySchedule Round(Ki, i) 
S ← State Round(S) end for 
 
end 
Algorithm 4 Gear (M) 
M0|M1|...|Ml ←padded(M) H0 = IV 
for i = 0 to l do 
Hi+1 =C− Gear (Hi,Mi)⊕Hi  
end for 
output truncated(Hl)  
 
end 
A list of test vectors in given in Table 4. 
Table 4: Test vectors for Gear -512 
Gear (“ ”) 
8798dbba48ffd3b62e239b549499c09b 
3d4637273489f9061f5e1d8d214e31ae 
1dc13d88a561c5594c9937ee864140e9 
7f7b93ffd27e79251d4755a20eca60a4 
Gear ("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") 
9b182c6da0010a92e6df1dd67515764b 
53a909aecc9be8dbf1c47bf876b4be42 
7b96491fbf8e2e90453b4ac9cabf4b5d 
73394019ca7801d11307e8d000eed3e2 
Gear ("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dag") 
257269675f2d432ba8dbece0b25d4ac9 
a95450c9788a6ef65cee1d1e349b7ed4 
a13e0302d0d8204f17832933896ac7e4 
4b9709fd6ddb0f86732200955b51648e 
 6. THE SECURITY OF THE MODE 
In our design we use two widely applied techniques for 
construction of hash functions, the Davies-Meyer mode and the 
Merkle-Damgård construction. 
The security of the single-block-length block cipher modes has 
been analyzed in [28, 6]. In particular, Black-Rogaway-
Shrimpton have proved that the Davies-Meyer mode has 
asymptotically optimal bound for collision and preimage 
resistance, i.e. the number of queries to the underlying cipher 
with randomly chosen key (a black box access) to find collisions 
or a preimage is roughly as predicted by the generic bound. Thus 
this mode is secure against the standard attacks and shortcut 
attacks can be found only by exploiting a weakness in the block 
cipher (but not in the mode). Therefore Gear is secure against the 
traditional attacks as long as C- Gear is secure. 
The Merkle-Damgård (MD) construction [12, 26] is an approach 
for building a collision resistant hash function from a collision 
resistant compression function. That is, if the hash function 
applies appropriate padding and the initial value is fixed, the 
hash function is collision resistant as long as the compression 
function has the same property. Note that in Gear, the initial 
value is fixed, and the padding is as required, thus the for 
collision resistance one only has to focus on the compression 
function. 
6.1 The Wide Pipe Construction 
The wide pipe construction proposed by Lucks [23] was 
developed to strengthen the security of the standard Merkle-
Damgård against a variety of generic attacks. Most of these 
attacks use the fact that the standard single-pipe chaining value 
and internal state can be insufficient against attacks that target 
the intermediate chaining values. In particular: 
 Length extension attacks – once the attacker has a single 
collision he can produce many more colliding message 
pairs. Assume H(·) is a single-pipe hash, and M1, M2 are 
such that H(M1) = H(M2). Then for any M, H(M1|M) = 
H(M2|M), thus the pair (M1|M,M2|M) is also a colliding 
pair. However, for wide-pipe hash function (such as in 
Gear), in general this is not true. The initial message pair 
M1, M2 collides only on half of the bits – the other half is 
truncated, and not necessarily produces collisions. Thus, 
extending the colliding pair with additional message results 
in a different input chaining values for the last compression 
function, and most likely, different hash values. 
 Second preimage attack by Kelsey-Schneier[19] – when 
the hashed message has l blocks (l invocations of 
compression functions), the complexity of finding a second 
preimage is 2n−l instead of the generic 2n. This comes from 
the fact that if the attacker is able to find a second preimage 
of any of the intermediate chaining values, then he will 
succeed to find a preimage for the whole hash. Thus instead 
of one final target (the digest), he can aim any of the l n-bit 
values. However, as in Gear the intermediate chaining 
values have at least 2n bits, the complexity of finding a 
second preimage for these values is at least 22n (instead of 
2n as in single-pipe). Thus, the wide-pipe Gear is resistant 
against this type of generic attacks. 
 Multicollisions by Joux[17] - producing multicollisions 
(many different messages hash to the same value) has much 
lower complexity than the generic bound. Joux has shown 
that for a single-pipe MD hash function, one can produce 
2t-collisions with only t · 2n/2 calls to the compression 
function. Joux’s idea is very simple and original – he 
proposed creating sequentially collisions for the 
consecutive compression function calls. That is, first one 
finds a colliding message pair (M 1
1
,  M 1
2
) for the first 
compression function, then (M 2
1
,  M 2
2
) for the second (the 
input chaining value coincides with the output of the 
previous), and keeps repeating this procedure for all t 
compression function calls. Then, all 2t messages M 1
𝑖1
 |
M 2
𝑖2
 | . . . | M l
𝑖l
 , ij ∈ 1, 2 hash to the same value. Again, to 
succeed with the above attack, one has to be able to find 
collisions (for the compression function), with a time 
complexity of finding collisions for the whole hash. 
However, in the double-pipe hash Gear, finding the 
intermediate collisions requires an effort of at least 2n 
compression function invocations. Therefore, Joux’s attack 
is not applicable to Gear. 
 Herding attack by Kelsey-Kohno[18] – the attacker 
presents a digest h, and then for an arbitrary message M he 
is able to find M2 such that H(M|M2) = h. The idea behind 
the herding attacks is the production of aso-called diamond 
structure. In brief, the attack is based again on producing 
collisions for the intermediate chaining values. Same as 
above, in Gear this type of attack is prevented by the wide-
pipe design. 
6.2  The Wide Trail Strategy 
The wide trail strategy [11] is one of the most popular 
approaches for designing block ciphers and cryptographic hash 
functions resistant against differential and linear attacks. 
Daemen and Rijmen noticed that the diffusion layer in SP 
ciphers can be chosen in a way that ensures a high number of 
differentially (or linearly) active S-boxes in any round-reduced 
characteristic. Two basic concepts are used for applying the 
wide trail: branch number and alternation of two different round 
transformations (which indeed can be combined into a single 
one). The branch number assures a minimal number of active S-
boxes in any two-round characteristic. As in C- Gear, the 
diffusion layer is based on MDS code (see the matrix 
multiplication), the branch number is maximal and equals to 9 – 
that is, any two-round differential (or linear) characteristic has at 
least 9 active S-boxes. The alternating transformations are 
achieved with two different linear layers – in the case of C- Gear 
these are the ShiftRows and MixColumns operations. As 
ShiftRows moves each row of the matrix to a different position, 
by Theorem 2 from [11], we get that any four-round trail has 9 · 
9 = 81 active S-boxes. Further in our analysis, we will use this 
lower bound to prove the resistance of Gear against various 
attacks. 
6.2.1 Collision Attacks 
The collision attacks on hash functions are based on finding 
differential trails with zero output difference. However, unlike 
differential distinguishers, where the probability can be as low 
as 2−n for n-bit hash, the trails for collisions have to have at least 
2−n/2 – otherwise, the generic collision finding algorithm (based 
for example on the Floyd’s cycle finding algorithm) would have 
lower complexity. We will show further in our analysis that no 
differential trail exists for C- Gear with a probability higher than 
2−n, which immediately allows to conclude that collision attacks 
based on differential trails are not applicable to Gear. Another 
 type of collision attacks are based on the use of weak modes for 
the compression function. However, as we have shown earlier, 
the mode of Gear is secure. We emphasize as well that the use of 
Merkle-Damgård construction assures that since our 
compression function is collision resistant, then the whole hash 
function Gear is collision resistant as well. 
6.2.2 Preimage Attacks 
The (second) preimage attacks for hash function based on secure 
modes usually exploit the weak message expansion, and in 
particular the low diffusion. Most of these attacks are based on 
the meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and the recent 
improvement in the form of splice and cut [1]. Although no 
sufficient conditions are currently available that ensure the 
compression function is secure against preimage attacks, a good 
rule of the thumb is to have a high diffusion in the message 
expansion. In Gear, the compression function is based on the 
cipher C- Gear that has a very high diffusion in the key schedule. 
Notice that in each round of the cipher, the whole key is used, 
and after only three rounds, the key schedule achieves a full 
diffusion of the bits of the key. Thus, it is expected that 
preimage attacks cannot be launched on very high number of 
rounds. The precise bound (or at least currently the best result) is 
achieved by taking into account the latest results on the similar 
hash function Grøstl [13]. Following the result on Wu et al. [29], 
it is clear that by using the partial matching technique and chunk 
separation, one can launch a pseudo-preimage attack on 8 
rounds of Gear -512, with around 2507 time and memory 
complexity – we omit the details as the analysis is very similar 
to the one presented in [29]. We also note that shortcut attacks 
that exploit weak modes are discarded as well as the mode used 
in Gear is provably secure against preimage attacks. 
6.2.3 Distinguishers 
Non-trivial distinguishing attacks became increasingly popular 
during the SHA- 3 competition [27]. In this section we show the 
resistance of Gear against all possible known distinguishers for 
byte-oriented primitives. 
A. Differential and Linear Distinguishers 
Let us first examine the resistance of C- Gear against the two 
most popular forms of analysis: the differential [3] and linear 
cryptanalysis [24]. Here we want to emphasize one important 
point – the claimed security level of the examined cipher will be 
only in accordance to the application for the hash function. As 
the maximal output size of Gear is 512 bits (all other versions 
have smaller output, thus generic attacks have lower 
complexity), we examine only the security of Gear -512. Thus, 
we need to prove that no differential and linear attacks on C- 
Gear exist with complexity lower than 2512. Although we do not 
claim higher security level for C- Gear, it is easy to extend the 
below analysis to reach such level – we omit the details as we 
use C- Gear only as an underlying cipher for 512-bit hash. 
 
 Linear attacks 
We have seen that C- Gear follows the wide trail strategy; hence 
any 4-round trail has at least 81 active S-boxes. The best linear 
bias of the S-box used in C- Gear is 2−3, thus the probability of 
any 4-round linear trail is at most 2−3·81 = 2−243, while for any 
12-round trail is at most 23·(−243) = 2−729. Hence, C- Gear achieves 
the claimed security level of 512 against linear cryptanalysis. 
We point out as well that the low probability linear trail 2−729 
requires an amount of approximately 21458 pairs of plaintext- 
ciphertext which exceeds the whole codebook – thus the security 
level of the cipher against linear cryptanalysis is actually 1024 
bits. 
 
 Standard differential attacks 
First let us take a look at standard differential attacks and in 
particular single-key differential trails. When there is no 
difference in the key of C- Gear (which can be translated into no 
difference in the message block of Gear), the resistance against 
differential attacks comes straightforwardly from the wide trail 
strategy: 1) the maximal differential propagation probability of 
the S-box is 2−6, 2) any four-round differential trail has 81 active 
S-box. Thus, the probability of any four-round differential trail 
is 2−6·81 = 2−486, while the probability of any eight-round trails is 
2−2·486 = 2−972. Obviously the low probability suffices to prove 
the claimed security bound of 512 bits. Better bounds (lower 
probability trails) can be proven when trails are on 12 rounds – 
then the security level of 1024 bits is achieved. We avoid this, as 
for Gear we need a security level of only 512 bits. 
Related-key differential attacks on C- Gear do not improve the 
complexity of the best attacks. This comes from the fact that the 
key schedule of C- Gear undergoes the same (or very similar) 
transformations. Thus the probability of any related-key 
differential characteristic, only in the key schedule, would be at 
most 2−972 for eight rounds. When C- Gear is used in the hash 
function mode (as in Gear), the attacker has the freedom to 
choose the key – thus let us further examine the possibility of 
message modification. For this purpose, we first obtain tighter 
bounds on probability. From the wide trail strategy it follows 
that any two-round trail has at least 9 active S-boxes and any 
four-round has 81 active. Hence, any six consecutive rounds 
have 90 active S-boxes and the probability of such differential 
trail is 2−6·90 = 2−540, i.e. it is lower than 2−512 (which we need as 
we work with 512-bit hash). The attacker can use message 
modification and choose the value of the state and the subkey in 
order to pass some rounds for free. However, out of all 16 
rounds, he has to pass 11 rounds with the modification. As both 
the state and the key schedule are highly complex, we believe 
that this is hard to achieve, and estimate that only 2-4 rounds can 
be passed for free with message modification. This brings the 
total number of attacked rounds to 7-9 (2,3,4 rounds for free + 5 
rounds probabilistically). 
 
 Truncated differential attacks 
Truncated differentials [21] became increasingly popular as 
form of analysis of byte-oriented primitives after the invention 
of the Rebound attack [25] and Super S-boxes [14, 22]. These 
techniques have shown that the message modification combined 
with truncated differential can significantly increase the number 
of attacked rounds in frameworks such as known-key 
distinguishers for block ciphers or hash function attacks. 
Moreover, they stressed out that one cannot known in advance 
how many rounds can be passed for free when using message 
modification. In our analysis below we assume that this number 
is four as this is the state-of-the-art – we point out that further 
advancement in this field may bring up the number of rounds. 
However, the large security margin in Gear assures that only 
significant progress can influence security of our hash function. 
Our design is similar to the hash function Grøstl [13], thus we 
follow the line of research given in [16] and show a truncated 
differential attack on 10 rounds of Gear -512. The differential is 
 given in Figure 1. The number of active S-boxes in the trail is as 
follow: 
64 → 8 → 1 → 8 → 64 → 128 → 64 → 8 → 1 → 8 → 64 
Using the technique from [16], we assume that the four middle 
rounds, i.e. 8 → 64 → 128 → 64 → 8, are part of the inbound 
phase of the rebound attack, thus it is passed for free. The 
remaining six rounds, the first three, and the last three, are the 
outbound phase, and are passed probabilistically. The 
probability of this phase is 22·(−56) = 2−112 – for each transition 8 
→ 1, it is 2−56, while the for the rest (1 → 8, 8 → 64), the 
probability is 1.  
  
Figure 1. The truncated differential for 10-round attack on 
Gear -512 
 
The complexity of finding a conforming pair for the inbound 
phase, is 2280 time and 264 memory (see [16] for details). Thus 
the total complexity of the attack is 2112+280 = 2392 time and 264 
memory. 
B. Slide Attacks 
Slide attacks [4, 5] exploit rounds self-similarity and can be 
devastating for launching attacks on ciphers that use completely 
equal round transformations. To stop this type of attacks, round 
constants are introduced. C- Gear does not employ constants as 
part of the state transformations; however, the key schedule 
applies the AddRoundConstant operation which assures that 
each round of the key schedule is different (note that the round 
constants Ci depend on the round index i). Any slid pair (with 
one or a few rounds apart), that is completely identical at the 
beginning, has to differ in the following round in at least 16 
bytes of the subkey – the whole bottom row would be different 
as the round index is different. This leads to a very fast 
expansion of the key difference (between the elements of the 
slid pair) in the few consecutive rounds which in turn assures a 
high number of active S-boxes. Hence slide attacks could be 
possibly applied to Gear on few rounds only. 
C. Integral Attacks 
Integral (or square) attack was first launched against the block 
cipher Square [10]. In general, it is applicable to any Rijndael-
like cipher, and it exploits the fact that the S-boxes are 
invertible. Unlike for ciphers, where integral attacks lead to a 
key recovery, for hash functions, the additional rounds before 
and after the square property cannot be efficiently exploited. 
Thus as Gear is Rijndael-based hash function, integral property 
can be exploited and we expect that integral attacks for Gear can 
be launched on around three-five rounds. 
D. Rotational Cryptanalysis 
Rotational attacks [20] follow the expansion through the rounds 
of the primitive of a pair of inputs where the second is a rotation 
of the first, i.e. each word (or possibly a byte or a column) of the 
second state, is produced by rotating the corresponding word of 
the first state. In general, rotational analysis is applicable to 
addition-rotation-xor primitives, however byte-oriented ciphers 
and hash function can be susceptible when the underlying 
transformations are rotational- friendly. The main method for 
achieving resistance against rotational attacks is the use of 
constants. In Gear, this is achieved by the AddRoundKey trans- 
formation. Note, that the key schedule assures that no rotational 
subkey pair can be produced in several consecutive rounds. 
Hence, we can conclude that rotational analysis is possibly 
applicable only to a few rounds of the compression function. 
E. Resistance Against Other Dedicated Distinguishers 
The methods of analysis of byte-oriented primitives have been 
known for a while now. In the previous sections we have 
investigated all such methods. Further we present a dedicated 
approach that might be applicable only to our function and the 
underlying block cipher. In fact we show that we have taken the 
necessary steps to stop this type of attack. Note that the state and 
the key have the same size and use very similar transformations. 
A possible attack that might exploit this type of property is the 
one where the adversary switches the key and the plaintext and 
produces the same ciphertext, i.e. EK(P) = EP(K). However, to 
launch such attack the transformations should be the same, or at 
least similar – in this case the property might work for particular 
inputs only. The transformations in the state and in the key 
schedule differ at two places: ShiftRows and key/constant 
addition. If at the input of ShiftRows the state and the subkey 
have the same value, then at the output would be the same only 
if all the bytes within the row are equal. To achieve the same 
property for the addition, AddRoundKey and 
AddRoundConstant should be the same as well, i.e. the constant 
has to coincide with the subkey. However, it is clear that since in 
AddRoundConstant the last row byte constants are different, the 
output of the next application of ShiftRows will not produce 
equal values for the last row. Thus Gear resists this type of 
distinguisher. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a new cryptographic hash function Gear that 
supports digests of up to 512 bits. Our proposal is based on the 
wide trail strategy and uses an underlying block cipher with 
1024 bit key and state. We use mode and construction with 
longstanding security analysis and provable against most of the 
generic attacks. We have shown that the hash function has a 
high security margin against all the known attacks available 
today. The claimed security level of Gear is given in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: The claimed security level of Gear and comparison 
to the level of an ideal hash function.  
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